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Abstract
One of the main tasks of IT business continuity planning
(BCP) is to guarantee that incidents affecting the IT infras-
tructure do not affect the availability of IT-dependent busi-
ness processes beyond a given acceptable extent. Carrying
out BCP of information systems is particularly challenging,
because it has to take into consideration the numerous in-
terdependencies between the IT assets typically present in
an organization. In this paper we present a model and a
tool supporting BCP auditing by allowing IT personnel to
estimate and validate the Recovery Time Objectives (to be)
set on the various processes of the organization. Our tool
can be integrated in COBIT-based risk assessment applica-
tions. Finally, we argue that our tool can be particularly
useful for the dynamic auditing of the BCP.
1 Introduction
Business Continuity (BC) is the discipline supporting an
organization in coping with the disruptive events that may
affect its IT infrastructure. The goal of BC is to guarantee
that – after incidents – the infrastructure will recover opera-
tions within a predefined time. This is achieved by carrying
out a Business Continuity Plan (BCP), which is part of the
Risk Mitigation phase of the Information Risk Management
process. In general, Risk Mitigation (RM) consists in de-
veloping and implementing a strategy to manage potential
harmful threats to the information systems. Since risk may
not be completely avoided because of financial and practical
limitations, RM (and BCP as well) includes the evaluation
and the conscious acceptance of a residual risk.
BC is quickly becoming a best practice among both en-
terprises and organizations also due to recent legislation
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 or the Basel
II [2] accord, which explicitly requires it.
Until recently, no widely agreed methodology was avail-
able to carry out a BCP. The new standard BS25999 [7],
published in 2006 by the British Standard Institute, has
changed this situation providing guidelines to understand,
develop and implement a BCP, and it aims to become a stan-
dard methodology. Notably, BS25999 requires an organiza-
tion to (1) identify the activities/processes supporting the
core services used by the organization, (2) identify the re-
lationships/dependencies between activities/processes, (3)
evaluate the impact of the disruption of the core ser-
vices/processes previously identified (during the Business
Impact Analysis, BIA).
One of the main goals of any BCP is achieving that
crucial business processes should recover from disruption
within a predefined Maximum Tolerable Period of Disrup-
tion (MTPD). The MTPD expresses the maximum accept-
able downtime to guarantee the business continuity. As
expected, the MTPD depends heavily on the organization
business goals and therefore is defined on the business pro-
cesses, and is determined by the business unit.
Since business processes typically depend on a variety
of underlying IT assets, the MTPD has a direct and indirect
impact on the maximum downtime that these assets may
exhibit in practice. Indeed, the standard technical mean to
realize a given MTPD is to define Recovery Time Objec-
tives (RTOs) on all IT assets supporting business activities
for which the BIA has determined that it is necessary to en-
sure continuity; RTOs strongly depend on the technical and
organizational measures the IT department implements to
deal with incidents.
Nowadays, determining RTOs that apply to the IT assets
is done manually, and it is a subjective work which heav-
ily depends on the experience of the IT personnel. This is
not only error-prone, but it does not scale well (to the point
that often, determining RTO’s is not even done for all enti-
ties, despite being required by the standard methodology).
Moreover, it is inconvenient in case of changes in the IT
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infrastructure or in the business goals. In particular, new
contracts and agreements can have an impact on the quality
of service a business process should deliver and ultimately
on the MTPD associated to it. Likewise, changes in the
IT infrastructure may affect dependencies and therefore the
impact of the IT assets on the business MTPDs. In both
cases, adapting the BCP to these changes, usually requires
a costly new analysis involving both the IT and business
units of the organization.
We present a new model-based tool to support the analy-
sis of temporal dependencies among IT assets and between
IT assets and business process. The primary goals of our
model and tool are (1) to support the IT department in set-
ting and validating the RTOs of the IT assets of the organi-
zation (2) to evaluate assigned RTOs w.r.t. the given MTPD
to find critical points in the IT infrastructure. Ultimately,
our model allows one to put down the fine-grained set of
premises and assumptions to infer that a given MTPD will
be achieved, thereby obtaining a more objective assessment
of the behaviour of the IT infrastructure.
While achieving these goals, we argue that our model
is particularly useful for dynamically auditing the BCP in
various ways: first, the tool allows one to visualize immedi-
ately how changes in business goals or in the IT infrastruc-
ture affect the compliance with given (or modified) MTPDs;
in particular, it is possible to compute whether the measures
already in place continue giving enough guarantees also af-
ter the changes. Secondly, it allows one to validate the ac-
tual response of the IT infrastructure w.r.t. the expected be-
haviour, promoting a continuous refinement of the model
which can adapt to new external circumstances, allowing
for early detection of new threats to the business continuity
targets.
Technically, our model is an improvement of the one we
presented in [18] for the optimization of countermeasures.
The essential difference with the previous model lies in the
modelling of the recovery time after disruption, which in the
present situation has to be much more accurate. Notably,
as we mention in Section 5, the data our model requires is
collected anyhow during a BCP.
2 Time Dependency and Recovery model
We now present the time dependency and recovery
(TDR) model, which allows us to model the response of an
organization to incidents. This model is based on the TD
model we introduced in [18] for the mitigation of availabil-
ity risks. In principle, the main difference from the previous
version is the way we model incidents and their response
time; in practice, the tool supporting it has completely dif-
ferent functionalities.
The basic elements of the model are the constituents of
the IT infrastructure. The model is compatible with no-
table architecture frameworks such as TOGAF [16], Zach-
man [17] and ArchiMate [1] as well as IT Governance solu-
tions (IBM [6] and ISACA [5]), to determine those elements
which may directly or indirectly be involved in an incident:
Processes, Applications and Information, Technology and
Infrastructure or Facilities.
We start by providing a brief summary of the data we
need to build the model. (1) A representation of the orga-
nization, consisting of: a set of entities (processes, applica-
tions, etc.) and a set of relationships between these entities.
Relationships model which entities depend on other entities
and must contain an estimate of how long an entity would
be able to survive if another entity it depends on becomes
unavailable. (2) A list of possible incidents affecting the IT
infrastructure, together with the time needed to repair them
(per entity) given the controls already in place. We also
need an estimate of their expected frequency, measured in
times per year. (3) The MTPD value for each business pro-
cess on the dependency graph. (4) Optionally, a first esti-
mate of the RTO value for each entity (not business process)
on the dependency graph. In Section 5 we address the prob-
lem of how and when this data can be collected during the
RA and BC processes.
Let us formalize the main notions. For this, we indicate
by R+ the set of positive real numbers, and by T the set of
all time intervals (expressed in hours).
We represent a TDR model using a graph, where nodes
represent the basic entities and labelled edges between
nodes represent their relationships. The presence of an edge
from node a to node b indicates that b depends on a and
that, if a becomes unavailable for long enough, b will be-
come unavailable as well. To model this correctly, we also
need to indicate how long b will be able to survive without
the presence of a. We do that by annotating each edge with
the survival time: the time span during which the dependent
entity can survive if the other one fails.
Definition 1 A TDR model is a pair 〈N,→〉 where N is a
set of nodes and→⊆ N ×N × T .
We write n1
t−→ n2 as shorthand for (n1, n2, t) ∈→. A
TDR model expresses e.g. the dependencies of hardware
components on the physical environment they are located
in, the dependency of an application on the machines it runs
on, the dependency of an application on another one feeding
it at regular time intervals and the dependency of a business
process on the applications supporting it. We will show in
Section 4 that this graph can be built in a fully automatic
way.
Running example - Part 1 We present here an example
(oversimplified, to fit the example in the format of the pa-
per) of the business/IT infrastructure of a small bank seg-
ment with ten entities (see Table 1): p1 and p2 represent
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Id Description
p1 Customer management process
p2 Financial services process
a1 Home banking application
a2 On-line trading application
a3 Financial founds management application
db1 Checking account database
db2 Trading database
m1 Application server machine
m2 DBMS machine
m3 DBMS machine
n1 Network segment
Table 1. List of entities in a simple enterprise
organization’s segment
two business processes; a1, a2 and a3 are three applica-
tions supporting business processes while db1 and db2 are
two databases accessed by applications. Finally, m1, m2
and m3 are the three machines running applications and
n1 is the network segment connecting the three machines.
Figure 1 shows a TDRmodel built with the entities from Ta-
Figure 1. A TDR model example
ble 1. The edges connecting n1 to m1, m2 and m3 express
the dependency of the machines on the network connection
with other machines. The connections from m1 to a1, a2
and a3, fromm2 to db1 and fromm3 to db2 express the de-
pendency of software processes (applications or databases)
on the machines they run on. For all of these connections
the survival time is set to zero, since no entity can survive
the disruption of the ones it depends on, not even for a short
time. In turn, p1 depends on both a1 and a2, since the cus-
tomer management is achieved by providing Internet bank-
ing and on-line trading, but with different time constraints
(five hours for a1 and only one hour for a2). A similar rea-
soning apply to a1 and p2.
Notice that dependency relationships are and relation-
ships: a node depending on two or more other nodes is dis-
rupted even if just one of these are affected by an incident.
For the sake of simplicity, in this work we do not consider
or relationships, even though it would be simple to include
them in our model.
Incidents and their propagation From the modelling
side, the main innovation of the TDR model w.r.t. the TD
model lies in the representation of incidents, which in the
present case needs to be much more accurate. Here, an in-
cident is an event causing an entity (or a set of entities) to
break down and become unavailable. Therefore, we iden-
tify an incident with the set of entities it brings down. Since
incidents can happen several times a year, business continu-
ity should deal with the frequency of incidents to determine
the proper strategies to be put in place.
Definition 2 Given a set of incidents I , the frequency esti-
mate is a mapping freq : I → R+ .
Finally, every disruptive event on an entity takes some
time to be repaired. Our model encompasses an estimate
of the repair time rt that is required by the affected entities
to become operational again. Here it is important to notice
that, in many cases, it is difficult to guarantee an uniform
repair time: repairing a disk could take up to two hours in
most cases (say, 90% of the cases), but up to four hours in
the remaining (exceptional) 10% of the cases. For instance,
a software bug affecting a new application can be repaired
in eight hours if it is discovered during the week, or within
24 hours during the week-end, due to lack of personnel. To
be accurate, our model requires an estimate of the recovery
time for both the general and the exceptional cases. For this
reason rt is expressed as a frequency distribution.
Definition 3 (Repair Time) Let Org = 〈N,→〉 be an or-
ganization and I be a set of incidents. The repair time rt is
a mapping rt : N × I × T → R+ .
The explicit modelling of the repair time as a frequency
distribution is the main theoretical difference between this
TDR model and the model we exposed in [18], since deal-
ing with BC requires a higher detail level w.r.t. the average
repair time needed to perform just a risk assessment. In-
terestingly, the functionalities of the tool we use here and
those described in [18] are completely different.
Every incident directly involves one or more entities,
causing them to be unavailable for a certain amount of time.
During this time the incident may propagate to other enti-
ties, following the TDR model.
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Definition 4 We say that an incident propagates from a
node n1 to n2, if they have a functional relationship and
the unavailability time of n1, due to the incident, exceeds
the survival time of n2 w.r.t. n1 causing n2 to become un-
available until the incident is resolved.
Running example - Part 2 Figure 2 shows how an in-
cident affecting m3 propagates across our organization.
Assume that an incident i occurs at t = 0 and it is repaired
Figure 2. Propagation chart of an incident
within nine hours after t. It brings down m3; at the same
time db2 becomes unavailable, since its survival time w.r.t.
m3 is zero. After five minutes a2 goes down and a3 follows
after fifteen minutes. Accordingly to the TDR model, after
one hour from the disruption of a2, process p1 goes down
and after eight hours p2 goes down as well. After i1 has
been repaired, nine hours after t, all entities are repaired in
turn.
3 Assessing the RTO
Recall that our goal is assessing whether, during the nor-
mal operation, the system will comply with the Maximum
Tolerable Period of Disruption that has been determined (by
the business unit) for the business relevant processes. The
formal definition is the following.
Definition 5 (MTPD) Let Org = 〈N,→〉 be an orga-
nization and P ⊂ N be the set of business processes,
the Maximum Tolerable Period of Disruption is a mapping
MTPD : P → T .
Running example - Part 3 The two business processes in
our example are noticeably time-dependent, because they
both require customer interaction and, in the case of p2, the
operational disruption causes a direct financial loss to the
bank. Because of this, it is reasonable to assume that the
MTPD is very short, as reported on Table 2.
Id Description MTPD
p1 Customer management process 3h
p2 Financial services process 0.5h
Table 2. MTPD values for the processes
3.1 Complying with the MTPD
One of our goals is to check under which circumstances
we can expect to be able to comply with the MTPD (i.e.,
we can expect all the business processes to recover from
disruptions within the maximum time given by the MTPD).
To this end, our model allows us to determine, given the
MTPD for the business critical processes, what is the maxi-
mum recovery time that each entity in the TDR model has to
respect. Assuming that the organizational graph is acyclic1,
this can be defined as follows.
Definition 6 (mrt) Let Org〈N,→〉 be an organization,
and let µ be an instance of the MTPD function for Org,
then for each n ∈ N we define the maximum recovery time
of n (w.r.t. µ)mrtµ(n) to be
• mrtµ(n) = µ(n) if n is a business process,
• mrtµ(n) = min{mrtµ(m) + d | n d−→ m}
Assuming that the TDR model is faithful, i.e. that it re-
flects well how incidents propagate across the organization,
the relevance of the maximum recovery time is given by the
following result.
Proposition 7 LetOrg〈N,→〉 be an organization, P ⊂ N
be the set of business processes, and µ be a MTPD for it. If
an incident on entity n ∈ N r P is not repaired within
mrtµ(n), then at least one business process p ∈ P will be
disrupted for longer than its MTPD. On the other hand, if
an incident on entity n ∈ NrP is repaired withinmrtµ(n),
then no business process p ∈ P will be disrupted for longer
than its MTPD.
Therefore, the mrtµ(n) we have calculated is actually the
maximum downtime we can tolerate on n to ensure that
the MTPD is respected for each business process depend-
ing (directly or indirectly) on it. Of course, the validity of
this result depends on the accuracy of the TDR model, but
it is worth mentioning here that (a) as we discuss later, the
data needed to build the TDR model is in most cases read-
ily available and (b) the model can be refined over time by
using statistics on incidents and their recovery.
1In most cases, the organizational graph is acyclic, or can be made
acyclic by some preprocessing.
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Recovery Time Objectives While the MTPD is a high-
level measure imposed on the critical business processes, it
is widely acknowledged that it should be good practice (also
required by standard BCP auditing) to set a Recovery Time
Objective on all the IT assets of the organization that can be
directly involved in incidents (machines, applications, in-
frastructure, etc. ). Our tool can be used to do this in an
automatic, fairly user-friendly way. This already represent
an improvement on everyday practices, in which RTO are
often not set at all.
Definition 8 (RTO) Let Org = 〈N,→〉 be an organiza-
tion and P ⊂ N be the set of business processes, the Re-
covery Time Objective is a mapping RTO : N r P → T .
Clearly, Proposition 7 implies that, if for each node n
RTO(n) ≤ mrtmt(n), then the compliance with respect
to the RTO implies compliance w.r.t. MTPD. Our model
allows us to validate the RTO imposed on the organization
as follows.
Proposition 9 LetOrg〈N,→〉 be an organization, and rto
be an RTO for it. Assume that for each n,m ∈ N such that
n
d−→ m the following holds
RTO(n) ≤ RTO(m)− d (1)
Then for any two entities n and m, holds that an incident
on the entity n ∈ N which causes on n a disruption shorter
than RTO(n) will never cause by propagation onm a dis-
ruption longer than RTO(m).
In other words, with our model we can validate the RTO
imposed on the entities by checking that they are truly pair-
wise compatible. If (1) is not satisfied for some n, m, then
an incident on nwhich causes on n a downtime shorter than
RTO(n) would cause on m by propagation a downtime
longer than RTO(m). In other words, if (1) is not satis-
fied then one could witness the paradoxical situation that
theRTO onm is not satisfied because of an incident on an-
other entity n, while this incident remained within the RTO
of n in the first place. RTOs are meant to define a local
standard that guarantees a global continuity level; because
of this we believe that an RTO not respecting (1) would be
of no practical use.
Running example - Part 4 By applying an algorithm
based on Proposition 7 to the TDR model in Figure 1, we
evaluate the mrt for each entity w.r.t. the MTPD expressed
in the previous example. Table 3 reports the original RTO
value assigned in the traditional way (i.e. manually) by the
IT-BCP group on the IT assets of the TDR model as well as
the automatically evaluated mrt. The traditionally assessed
RTO is in some cases too short and in other cases too
long, i.e. insufficient to ensure the business continuity. By
Id RTO mrt
a1 6h 8h
a2 6h 4h
a3 6h 24h 30’
db1 5h 8h 10’
db2 5h 4h 5’
m1 5h 4h
m2 7h 8h 10’
m3 3h 4h 5’
n1 8h 4h
Table 3. Manually assessed RTO and mrt val-
ues evaluated by means of the model
applying Proposition 9, we compare the original RTO w.r.t.
the mrt and find four critical points (outlined by a bold
circle in Figure 3), where the original RTO value exceeds
the mrt.
Figure 3. Critical points in the traditional RTO
assignment
3.2 Exceeding the MTPD
As it is impossible to achieve total security, it is often
difficult to comply all the times with the given MTPD. Dis-
asters happen and it is normal to accept a residual risk, im-
plying that the given MTPD may be exceeded in truly ex-
ceptional situations. For instance, there could be some par-
ticularly serious incidents that cannot be recovered in time.
On the other hand, the IT department may be unprepared
to handle some disruptive events due to lack of personnel
or resources. To deal with that, two ways are possible: (1)
the organization’s management decides to employ more re-
sources and deploy new controls allowing to shorten the
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disruption time, or (2) the risk of exceeding the MTPD is
accepted within a given probability.
However, to be able to accept the risk of exceeding the
MTPD, an organization needs to have a reasonable estimate
of how often this is going to happen in a given time period
(which could be one year or ten years, for instance).
To this end, we can use our TDR model. We know from
Proposition 7 that every time an incident occurring on an
entity is not repaired within its mrt one or more business
processes depending on the entity will become unavailable
for longer than their MTPD.
Therefore, to evaluate the frequency a business process p
exceeds its MTPD we need to know how many occurrences
of the incidents, affecting the entities on which p (directly
or indirectly) depends on, exceed theirmrt. To this end we
use the recovery time distribution that is evaluated during
the risk assessment phase.
Definition 10 Let n ∈ N be an entity, p ∈ P be a business
process and mt = MTPD(p) be its MTPD. If I is the set
of incidents affecting n, the frequency n exceeds its mrt
because of incidents I is:
Φ(n, I) =
∑
i∈I
freq(i)×
∑
t>mrtmt(n)
rt(n, i, t)
Intuitively, Φ(n, I) expresses the number of times an en-
tity n exceeds its mrt because of a set of incidents I . The
following proposition expresses how we use Φ to evaluate
Fex(p), which expresses how many times the MTPD is ex-
ceeded, given a business process p.
Proposition 11 Let p be a business process and Ep be the
set of entities on which p depends on, directly or by prop-
agation. If ∀m ∈ Ep, Im is the set of all the incident that
can occur onm then:
Fex(p) =
∑
m∈Ep
Φ(m, Im) (2)
In other words, the frequency a process exceeds its
MTPD is determined by the sum of the frequencies the en-
tities it depends on exceed their mrt. With such an infor-
mation, the business unit is able to verify if the residual risk
it is willing to accept is not further exceeded by the IT de-
partment. Such a condition would require the development
of more effective strategies to reduce the recovery time to
incidents.
Running example - Part 5 Let us introduce two incidents
i1 and i2, the first affecting a2, the second affecting db2. i1
is estimated to happen five times a year and it is repaired
within three hours in the 80% of the cases and within eight
hours in the remaining 20%. i2 is estimated to happen seven
times a year and it is repaired within four hours in the 90%
of the cases and within six hours in the remaining 10%. If
we consider the MTPD of p1 (three hours), then the mrt
is 4h for a2 and 4h5’ for db2. The frequency db2 exceeds
its mrt is 0.7 times a year, while the frequency a2 exceeds
its mrt is 1 time a year. Consequently, assuming that the
only incidents affecting the entities in the TDR model are
i1 and i2, our tool allows us to compute that p1 is expected
to exceed its MTPD 1.7 times a year (once a year by 3h,
equivalent to the 200% of the MTPD, and 0.7 times a year
by 1h55’, equivalent to the 164% of the MTPD).
4 The Practice
Our experience on BCP auditing is based on the gen-
eral approach used by KPMG Italy. Regarding the BIA, the
procedure that is commonly used within organizations to
establish the MTPD for the business processes is based on
the qualitative analysis of the impact, as perceived by the
process owner (business unit), of the consequences of a dis-
ruption on the process itself. On the other hand, regarding
RTOs, only certain entities (most of the applications) are
taken into consideration and are labelled with a RTO, since
it is difficult to properly evaluate the relationships between
the different entities manually.
The first important contribution of our model is that all
the relationships are properly evaluated, thus enabling the
IT department to extract the RTO values for each involved
entity (even machines, networks and infrastructures).
We implemented our model with a tool designed to be an
additional component of KARISMA (which is the tool de-
veloped at KPMG to support Risk Assessment, see Section
5): this enables us to repeat and validate the assessment
previously done by the KPMG auditing team. The tool is
based on the TDR model as an annotated graph by repre-
senting each entry with a node and each link with an edge
between nodes, annotated with the survival time. It is pro-
vided with algorithms directly derived from the framework
proposed in Section 3.
We tested our model on a KARISMA database of an Ital-
ian primary insurance company. This data was collected
during an auditing activity carried out by KPMG, and con-
tains information regarding the TDR model (19 macro busi-
ness processes and 122 sub-processes) and the results of
the BIA analysis providing the MTPD value for each sub-
process. The remaining information required by our model
(about incidents, repair time and frequencies) was also pro-
vided by the KPMG auditing team who conducted the as-
sessment.
We achieved two results: first we were able to assign an
RTO to all the entities of the TDR model by using the mrt
automatically calculated by the tool. This allows the IT de-
partment to assess its ability to comply with its RTOs and,
if necessary, arrange with the business unit an exceeding
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Figure 4. An example of critical point found
with our tool. The misleading evaluation of
A2’s RTO to 7h is caused by the lack in con-
sidering the relationship of A2 with A1. If A2
is repaired in more than 6h, process P1 will
be disrupted for more than its MTPD.
rate. Second, we found some critical points in the previous
setting of RTO for the applications. In case of applications
supporting more than one business process and other appli-
cations, we found that the RTO was in some cases either
very close to the mrt (in which case it becomes critical),
or it was underestimated (longer than required) because,
as we mentioned before, the relationships between applica-
tions were not taken into consideration properly (see Figure
4).
Summarizing, our tool allows one to automatically per-
form two different assessments: firstly to set properly RTO
values for a given business process; secondly, to support
auditors during the BCP validation. Once a BCP has been
established and put in place, the validation phase occurs to
ensure that the plan is adequate, complete and appropriate
w.r.t. the organization’s information system [14]. A crucial
point is based on the auditing of recovery controls: the au-
ditor must verify that RTO values meet the business require-
ments. Our tool supports this kind of verification, since ev-
ery check is made in an automatic way, possibly discovering
weaknesses in the BCP.
5 Discussion
In this section we argue the feasibility of our approach
and its usefulness to support dynamic auditing of the BCP.
Feasibility and Validation The main concern regarding
the feasibility of our approach is whether the required set of
data is easy to collect. If this was not the case, organizations
would not be willing to accept it. Fortunately, the data it re-
quires is typically available after RA and BCP: first of all,
an accurate map of the IT infrastructure is readily available
after a BCP carried out following the BS25999 [7] standard
(and is also after RAs). Secondly, an inventory of possible
incidents, together with their frequency has to be compiled
during the RA. Finally, a BCP should provide (accordingly
to the BS25999 standard) a complete evaluation of the ef-
fectiveness of chosen incident response strategies.
To further substantiate our argument, we note that this
data is also collected by tools devised to assist the RA
and RM processes. For instance, the Italian branch of
KPMG [11] (a worldwide company delivering also Infor-
mation Risk Advisory services) has developed a customiz-
able tool, KARISMA (Kpmg Advanced RISk MAnage-
ment), to support their RA activities. Among the informa-
tion KARISMA collects via a question-driven procedure,
there is a map of the business process entities (together
with their relationships) and the Business Impact Analy-
sis values. KARISMA is based on COBIT, and it is very
likely that other tools for RA, based on COBIT, would col-
lect the same information. Our system can thus be regarded
as an additional component for KARISMA or for any other
COBIT-based tool for RA, supporting in particular the Busi-
ness Continuity Planning activity.
We also note that most of the information required to
build the TDR model is also available when applying to
an organization an architectural framework, such as TO-
GAF [16], Zachman [17] and ArchiMate [1]. Indeed, the
layers defined in those frameworks are similar to the ones
we adopt for our model, though used for different pur-
poses (e.g. architectural support, new component impact
evaluation, etc.). Since those projects are widely employed
(ArchiMate for instance is used by ABN Amro and the
Dutch Tax Office), and are supported by several tools, they
provide us an indirect confirmation of the feasibility of ac-
tually obtaining the data needed by our model.
Summarizing, our tool does not require organizations to
acquire new information (i.e. to employ new resources),
rather it uses in a different way the information already
available after RA and BCP.
Dynamic Auditing Finally, we argue that our framework
is particularly useful to support a dynamic auditing process.
The concept of dynamic auditing is well-known among the
risk management strategies, particularly in the field of soft-
ware engineering [13]. The goal of this process is to con-
tinuously assess what could go wrong in projects (i.e., what
the risks are), determining which of these risks are most
relevant, and implementing strategies to deal with them.
Even though many of the methodologies for risk manage-
ment [5, 3, 8], as well as those for BC [7], include a mon-
itoring and reviewing step, this process can be performed
with different degrees of granularity, according on how flex-
ible the methodology is. For example, a change on the IT
infrastructure, involving the dismantling of a set of appli-
cations and machines and the introduction of new software
and hardware components, may involve either the assess-
ment of the new components only, or of the whole organi-
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zation, depending on how much it is possible to reuse the
previous assessment results.
Thanks to the fine granularity and the high degree of in-
dependence of the used information (time dependencies, as-
sessment of incidents, importance of processes to the busi-
ness), our model and tool are particularly suitable to support
a dynamic assessment process.
For instance, when dealing with a change in the organi-
zation, be it the rearrangement of the IT infrastructure or a
new business strategy, after a simple update of the model,
the framework can be used to evaluate the new time con-
straints within which incidents must be repaired to preserve
the business continuity. In the case a new component is
added to the information system, it is only necessary to add
the new component in the TDR model and specify its func-
tional and temporal relationships with the other components
to evaluate its new RTO. On the other hand, if a process be-
comes more important for the organization’s business (due
to changes in business strategy), it is possible to change its
MTPD and automatically assess the IT infrastructure to ver-
ify if it is still able to ensure the new time constraints.
In addition, after the occurrence of an incident, our
model allows us to verify if the incident response propa-
gation is compliant to the expected behaviour. It might hap-
pen that a time dependency between two applications, that
was estimated to be of one hour, is in fact of one hour and a
half. Furthermore, one might observe that the response time
to an incident exceeds the forecasted RTO. In those cases,
the model can be easily updated with the new collected in-
formation, thereby allowing to rapidly assess the new sit-
uation and develop new and more efficient BC strategies,
if needed. This feature adds quality to our solution since
it enables the BC team to organically capitalize on practi-
cal experience to improve accuracy of the model and of the
outcome in time.
In this perspective, the ability to easily refine the model
helps at improving the way organizations traditionally deal
with incidents. Instead of simply solving the problem when
it happens and then forgetting about it, our solution pro-
motes the continuous monitoring of the performances of the
repair operations by collecting new information as incidents
occur and then use them to improve the efficiency of the re-
sponse on new occurrences.
Summarizing, our system allows one to (a) easily adjust
the model to changes in the organization and/or its business
target, without the need of a complete new assessment, and
(b) refine the model (i.e., make it more precise) in the mo-
ment in which new and more accurate information is avail-
able about the actual behaviour of the organization.
6 Related Work
Although the Business Continuity Planning process is
well described in a number of works [12, 9] and recently has
been standardized by the British Standard Institute [7], for-
mal models to support it are still understudied. Despite this
situation, there are some specific fields for which specific
tools have been developed to accurately evaluate the surviv-
ability of IT systems. This is the case of telecommunication
networks, where the high availability of the network must
be ensured through a proper BCP. Jrad et al. [10] propose
a BCP model devised to determine the expected downtime
due to disaster events as well as normal and software fail-
ures in a networked environment and especially tailored for
the IT infrastructure of telecommunication networks. The
model can be used to predict the probability that a disaster
will cause a service disruption. Even though their approach
may be extended to every IT networked infrastructure, we
believe that it does not properly evaluate the dependencies
between the constituents of the IT infrastructure, and in par-
ticular the survival time between them. Furthermore our
model is explicitly designed to assess the current RTOs and
find critical points, whatever the technique is used to deter-
mine incidents likelihood and response time.
Another approach to evaluate the survivability of a sys-
tem is the one proposed by Cloth and Haverkort in [4].
They describe the system under assessment as a Stochas-
tic Petri Net and then automatically convert it into a Con-
tinuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC). Finally they use a
model checking engine to obtain a time-probability chart
that expresses the recovery probability in relation to the re-
covery time. The scope of their approach (1) is limited to a
particular distributed environment, where a much more fine
grained description of the system is considered and (2) only
the recovery time is the desired output. This is a very appre-
ciated requirement when dealing with dependability issues
in system design, but is not suitable for large infrastructures
considered in BCP. On the other hand, our approach is de-
vised to assess the compatibility with the business unit re-
quirements with those ensured by the IT department.
In addition to academic work, there exist a number of
commercial tools supporting BCP. The most closely related
to our work is Shadow Planner [15]. It is an (industrial)
application developed to support organizations in assessing
risks and establish a BCP. The software has several modules
to map the organizations’s IT infrastructure, collect BIA in-
formation, asset values, etc. Thus, it is able to evaluate the
monetary impact of a certain incident. Differently from our
approach, it is not based on a model and the relationships
between different entities are not properly evaluated. This
could hardly affect the way a disruption event is evaluated,
resulting in an erroneous planning of countermeasures to
ensure business process MTPDs (and the related RTOs).
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